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Energy as a service (EaaS) is an emerging business model that enables the oth-
erwise passive energy consumers to play an active role and participate in the
energy utility services. This platform is formed through smart contracts regis-
tering peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions of energy through price and quantity.
Many industries, including finance, have already leveraged smart contracts to
introduce digital currencies. At this time, the utility industry is faced with the
challenge of how to structure smart contract formation in a local energy mar-
ket. Specifically, they are faced with the challenge of maintaining a balance
between energy generation and demand while enabling traceability, security,
and unbiased peer-to-peer energy transactions, especially within a virtual
power plant. This article aims at addressing the aforementioned challenges. In
particular, this article investigates how to structure the microgrids in a local
energy market, and how to ensure balance and resiliency with incomplete
information. Taking various generation asset dimensions and demand profiles
into account, simulations are performed. A novel evolutionary computing
strategy to structure the simulation is proposed. A comparison is made among
random order, random selection, profit-based ranking, and evolutionary strat-
egy for coordinating the contract formation. The discussions draw attention to
each method's advantages and disadvantages in terms of their value as a strat-
egy for forming smart contracts in a local energy market.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The current environmental challenges due to global
warming, together with the increasing prevalence of
renewable resources, are behind the rapid emergence of
distributed energy systems. Indeed, distributed energy
systems have been recognized as an efficient, resilient,
and environmentally friendly alternative to the existing
traditional energy system.1 Distributed energy systems
consist of small-scale power generators located within
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the electric distribution system at or near the end users.
Since they are characterized by multi-generation and
have an emphasis on clean energy and low emissions,
they are increasingly attracting attention.2 Distributed
energy systems represent a paradigm shift, as they pro-
vide consumers with opportunities to reduce costs and
can increase revenues through local generation and load
management. This customer-centric paradigmatic shift is
the main impetus behind the modern concept of energy
as a service (EaaS) that is recently discussed in the
literature.
“At its most basic, EaaS can be defined as a model
that applies innovative technology and data management
in ways that give customers more control over how much
power they use and what they spend for it.”3 Examples of
EaaS include energy management for data centers, charg-
ing infrastructure for electrical vehicles (EVs), fuel cost
optimization for airlines, and energy risk management.4
EaaS often involves innovative business models that use
customer information to create value. EaaS is empowered
by peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading and business models
for local energy markets. Indeed, with the increasing con-
nectivity between distributed energy resources, the new
concept of a prosumers arises. A prosumer is one who
both consumes and generates energy. P2P energy trading
represents direct energy trading between peers, who buy
or sell energy directly with each other, without the
involvement of conventional energy suppliers.5 P2P
energy trading is usually implemented within a local
electricity distribution system; thus, it is tightly con-
nected to the concept of local energy markets. Local
energy markets are organized in a decentralized fashion,
and they can significantly contribute to decreasing the
need for extensive investments in transmission capacity.6
P2P energy trading and local energy markets are novel
concepts that have received increasing attention in the
recent literature. This is due to advancements in online
services based on information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs). ICT-based services enable, support, and
enhance the concrete implementation and investigation
of such novel frameworks.7 State-of-the-art analyses and
perspectives for P2P energy trading are discussed in Ref-
erence 8. A review of existing P2P energy-trading projects
can be found in Reference 9 whereas a review of architec-
tures, distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), and market
analysis for microgrid (MG) transactive energy (TE) can
be found in Reference 10. An assessment of the P2P
energy-trading potential for the residential sector is pro-
vided by Reference 11. The P2P trading concept has been
addressed within a wide range of applications, such as
within community MGs,12 federated power plants,13
smart homes,14 home energy management and distrib-
uted optimal power flow,15 EVs,16 and low voltage
electrical distribution networks.17 Peer-to-peer energy
trading requires the design of novel local energy markets.
An optimization-based market clearing design, which
incorporates multiple energy carriers and is intended for
use with local energy markets, is proposed in Reference
18, whereas a hybrid trading network construction for
local energy markets is discussed in Reference 19. Paths
towards integrated, open, and distributed energy markets
are also discussed in Reference 20. Local energy market
strategies are discussed in Reference 21, and a novel vir-
tual energy hub plant located within a thermal energy
market is proposed in References 22 and 23. Consumers'
viewpoints on new energy markets have been gathered in
Reference 24, and real-world case studies have also been
implemented and investigated, such as References 25-27.
Recent advancements in information and communi-
cation technology have contributed to peer-to-peer
energy trading and to energy markets, especially through
the novel concepts of blockchain and smart contracts. A
blockchain is a distributed software system that allows
transactions to be processed without the necessity of a
trusted third party.28 It leads to a quicker and cheaper
completion of business activities. The blockchain tech-
nology enables smart contracts, defined as computer pro-
grams or transaction protocols that “automatically,
execute, control or document legally relevant events and
actions according to the terms of a contract or an agree-
ment.”29 Blockchain-based P2P energy trading is becom-
ing very popular in the scientific literature, and many
recent works such as References 30-32 have addressed
this concept, where the latter is even proposing a pilot
energy-trading platform. In terms of concrete
implementations, virtual power plants (VPPs) represent a
real-world application with challenges and opportunities.
As described in Reference 33, a VPP is a system that inte-
grates several types of power sources. The main objective
of a VPP is to give a reliable and power supply. The
sources of a VPP are often a cluster of distributed genera-
tion systems with intermittent renewable energies. The
authors in Reference 34 introduce the novel concept of
P2P energy trading in a VPP based on blockchain smart
contracts. Another blockchain-based energy-trading
mechanism for VPPs is proposed in Reference 35,
whereas authors in Reference 13 address the use of peer-
to-peer energy-trading platforms to incentivize prosumers
to form federated power plants. However, while the sci-
entific literature addresses P2P energy trading and
blockchain-based smart contracts within MGs and house-
holds, there is not much work carried out within the field
of VPPs.
Since the application of smart contracts to EaaS is a
relatively new field of research, there is currently a gap in
strategies for forming smart contracts. While the existing
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literature proposes how technically smart contracts can
be formed for EaaS, the proposed article aims at widen-
ing the knowledge by
• Proposing a novel evolutionary computing strategy.
• Comparing this novel strategy with two traditional
strategies (random selection and profit-based ordering)
and determining which strategies are most suitable for
which scenarios.
This article addresses a scenario where multiple
picogrids are participating in a VPP as asset owners and
addresses the challenge of how different smart contract
formation can facilitate energy transactions in this sce-
nario. To the best of the authors' knowledge, there is no
existing research available that considers energy as a ser-
vice within a VPP.
1.1 | Paper objective and proposed
approach
As outlined in the previous section, although there is a
plethora of scientific literature available on the topics of
P2P energy trading and blockchain, the main applica-
tions are currently in the subjects of smart grids and
behind-the-meter, yet very little work is available on the
topic of VPPs. The convergence of the virtual layer
(blockchain) and the physical layer (power system) forms
a VPP, and this lesser studied area of convergence moti-
vates this research. This is why the main objective of this
article is to study blockchain-based smart contract forma-
tion for particular application to VPPs, as this subject has
not yet received a wide attention in the literature.
The main problem addressed in the article can be
summarized as follows. Smart contracts are used to facili-
tate peer-to-peer energy transactions. When a large num-
ber of prosumers want to make energy transactions, the
challenge for the network operator is to coordinate and
organize the transactions so as to ensure the security and
reliability of the power supply. This article investigates a
resolution to this problem by evaluating three different
strategies for forming smart contracts in ways suitable to
handle large numbers of energy transactions. Compari-
sons between the different strategies are based on profit
and asset installation.
The proposed approach is highly interdisciplinary,
involving subjects at the intersection of power systems
and engineering, computer science, mathematics, and
economics, which together can be referred to the emerg-
ing domain of Energy Informatics.36 From a power sys-
tem and engineering perspective, the proposed article
focuses on the concept of VPPs. From a computer science
perspective, the article proposes the use of genetic and
evolutionary computing approaches.37 Mathematics is
brought into the picture through the use of mathematical
optimization approaches. Finally, the field of economics
is involved via the concepts of local energy markets and
smart contracts, which are at the heart of the
proposed work.
1.2 | Challenges and solutions
VPPs are now increasing with both size and numbers
across the world. VPPs are typically formed by pooling
assets together from geographically distributed resources.
This article moves the focus towards the coordination of
transactions and assets within the VPP. We are interested
in particular in a novel transition from a small number of
big assets, towards a large number of small assets within
a VPP. This interest is motivated by the increase in dis-
tributed energy resources that characterize the current
energy systems. The transition requires facilitating peer-
to-peer transactions among the asset owners and other
stakeholders through energy-as-a-service business
models. This article addresses a scenario where multiple
picogrids are participating in a VPP as asset owners. The
challenge the article addresses is how different smart
contract formation can facilitate energy transactions
between picogrids within a VPP. To the best of the
authors' knowledge, there is yet to have any research
works available that considers energy as a service
within a VPP.
Figure 1 presents an overview of the existing chal-
lenges and the modelling techniques and paradigms that
can be used to address these challenges. The lower part
of the figure presents the advantages of smart contracts
and how smart contracts can be a solution for addressing
the challenges outlined on the left side. Each box shown
on the left side of the figure is connected to boxes on the
right side, in order to schematically identify the key fea-
tures of the proposed model that are meant to address a
specific challenge.
1.3 | Key contributions
The key contribution of this article is to propose a compar-
ative analysis of energy-as-a-service business model for a
blockchain-based local energy market. A comprehensive
case study is performed including 10 test cases with
10 grids in each test case. Each test case includes various
capacities of generation units and load demand patterns.
Four strategies—namely self-contained, random ordering,
profit-based ordering, and evolutionary ordering of
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grids—are compared and contrasted. In total, 1200 simu-
lations are carried out for this investigation. The evolu-
tionary computing strategy is proposed with the fitness
criteria of maximizing profit, while ensuring an efficient
utilization of the total energy produced from renewable
resources. The analysis clearly indicates how different
smart contract formation strategies perform. The pro-
posed evolutionary strategy is distinctly (over 40%) per-
forming better during the winter in comparison with the
other strategies. Electricity tariffs are a key parameter
that would impact or influence the smart contract forma-
tion. Distribution system operators are actively investi-
gating how to formulate the dynamic tariffs such as time
of use or volume of consumption. This work also
includes a series of simulations with different distribu-
tion grid tariffs to demonstrate the sensitivity of smart
contract formation when the network tariff increases or
decreases. It was observed that, with an increase in the
tariffs, the number of contracts formed is reduced
significantly, and likewise when tariffs decrease, more
contracts are formed. This shows that regulating the tar-
iffs would facilitate local energy market formation, and
thereby, a policy of regulation is required. Moreover, this
work can represent a basis to form or revise policies for
local energy markets through smart contracts. It is more
important than ever as more and more small- to
medium-scale generation units are being integrated into
the grid or are being deployed behind the meter to meet
the demand locally.
2 | EXPERIMENT FORMATION
AND DATASET
The simulation includes 10 grid data files. Each file repre-
sents 10 unique, individual grids. Each grid data file ini-
tializes the demand at each node, existing sources of
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FIGURE 1 Challenges and smart contract as a solution for energy as a service
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a quantity of battery storage), and their associated costs
occurring from investments and operations. The grid data
file also consists of price information: PriceA and PriceB.
PriceA is the procured price for underutilized electricity
procured from a conventional source (EA), and PriceB is
the procured price for underutilized electricity based on
renewable resources (EB) from an adjacent grid. The time
horizon considered for this study is hourly data, for
7 days, for five nodes. Each node is characterized by its
own demand, generation capacity, production, and elec-
tricity storage capacity. For simulation purposes, the data
profiles used are representative of both winter and sum-
mer electricity consumption and generations typically
noticed in Northern Europe.38,39 The demand, wind/solar
generation, PriceA, PriceB, and tariff profiles for each of
the 10 grid data files (each representing 10 individual
unique grids) are plotted in Figure 2 along with their
assigned colors.
Winters are characterized by high wind generation
overnight and in the early morning—typically from 10 PM
to 5 AM—and low to medium wind generation during the
daytime between 7 AM and 8 PM. Twin peaks characterize
demand: one peak in the morning between 6 and 9 AM,
with medium to high consumption during the rest of the
day (due to heating, lighting, and other factors), followed
by a subsequent peak in the evening between 6 and 9 PM.
There is relatively low demand from 9 PM until 6 AM the
next day. Summers are normally characterized by very
high Solar PV generation early in the day from about
5 AM, lasting late in the evening until around 7 or 8 PM.
Twin peaks typically characterize the demand profile
during summer, one in the morning between 6 and 9 AM,
followed by low to medium consumption during the rest
of the day, with another peak in the evening between
6 and 9 PM, followed by relatively low demand until 6 AM
the next day.
The input parameters from the grid data files repre-
sented in Figure 2 above are cumulative demand, wind
production during winter, cumulative solar PV produc-
tion during summer, procurement price of conventional
energy (PriceA), and procurement price of renewable
energy (PriceB) with a week-long time horizon and
hourly resolution for each of the 10 grids. The price of
conventional energy (PriceA) is higher than the price of
renewable energy (PriceB).40 Moreover, the operational
cost of battery assets throughout the vast majority of the
entire analysis period is less than that of PriceA and
PriceB, to facilitate better utilization of grid battery assets.
FIGURE 2 Normalized demand, generation, PriceA and PriceB profiles of Grid 1 (A), Grid 2 (B), Grid 3 (C), Grid 4 (D), Grid 5 (E), Grid
6 (F), Grid 7 (G), Grid 8 (H), Grid 9 (I), and Grid 10 (J) Data files for the winter and summer seasons
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A set of 10 grid data files together comprises one test set.
The test table is made up of 10 test sets, each test set with
the same 10 grid data files representing the individual
10 grids ordered randomly. Figure 3 displays the test
table used for the simulations. The color coordination
helps to identify which grid data file is in which position
for each of the 10 test sets. The test table is the same for
both summer and winter simulations.
The effects of price signals are also investigated in this
article. This study includes an investigation into the
influence of tariffs on the way in which the grids orga-
nize themselves for consensus formations, the effect the
tariffs have on additional generation unit investments,
and the effect on individual grid profits and the overall
system profits, etc., for both seasons. To study the effect,
price signals have five test sets, each with different levels
of PriceA and PriceB tariffs, are tested as follows:
• Test Set 1—a reference or base level tariffs of PriceA
and PriceB
• Test Set 2—PriceA and PriceB tariffs 2 times (2) the
base level
• Test Set 3—PriceA and PriceB tariffs 1.5 times (1.5)
the base level
• Test Set 4—PriceA and PriceB tariffs 0.5 times (0.5)
the base level
• Test Set 5—PriceA and PriceB tariffs 0.25 times
(0.25) the base level
Figure 4 presents the four different PriceA and PriceB
tariff levels against the base PriceA and PriceB tariffs. To
isolate, visualize and discern the effects of price signals
through tariffs, a set of 10 grid data files are used. These
10 grid data files are arranged in the same order, and they
are used across the five test sets for simulations. The only
parameters that change between the five test sets are the
tariffs, that is, PriceA and PriceB. These tests are simu-
lated for both summer and winter seasons.
3 | CONSENSUS FORMATION AND
SPECULATIONS
3.1 | The distribution ledger technology
The DLT provides a platform for deploying decentralized
applications with no central authority for storing and
sharing transactions across multiple ledgers. These led-
gers are where the users store data. In DLT, the flow of
data is represented in the network as transactions
between peers. To ensure ownership, validations, and
immutability, ledgers need to use special data structures,
see Reference 41. There are currently two types of data
structures used in ledgers, blockchain and direct acyclic
graphs (DAG), see Reference 42. Blockchain is the most
popular among the two structures. It uses blocks to store
data under cryptographic and algorithmic methods,
recording and synchronizing the data across the network,
thus ensuring the aforementioned ownership, validation,
and immutability. The blockchain structure is
implemented in well-known platforms such as Bitcoin,
Ethereum, and Chainlink. The literature, such as Refer-
ences 43 and 44 or 45, shows that DLT provides hidden
data, non-traceability, decentralized and transaction vali-
dation using key encryption, zero-knowledge proof, ring
signatures, or holomorphic encryption. In this context,
FIGURE 3 Simulation test table
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smart contracts allow for automation on a DLT to go
beyond the mere execution of transactions. They enable
the execution of arbitrary code in a decentralized loca-
tion, which is unforgeable, meaning no single party can
manipulate it (see Reference 46) Smart contracts imply
computing and time resources in the distributed ledgers,
so this is normally limited and measured. For example,
in Ethereum,47 each operation is paid for using gas,
preventing an attacker from running long tasks or infi-
nite loops. Finally, in DLT, there are actors that provide a
secure connection between the blockchain and outside
services. These “oracles” are a third party and trusted
authority.48
Figure 5 depicts a DLT that connects energy genera-
tion and energy consumption and illustrates the elements
of networking them together.49 The generation side is
typically made up of different generating assets including
PV farms, (like solar or wind farms), conventional gener-
ation types, and grid electricity storage. Similarly, the
consumption side constitutes different consumer types
like inflexible or flexible consumers, either of whom can
be residential or large industrial consumers. In this con-
text, energy generators and consumers need to share data
and smart contract with negotiated rules. The generator
needs to satisfy the demand of a consumer according to
an agreed upon price during a period of time, while the
consumer pays for this service at a fixed price. Con-
sumers and generators do not know anything about each
other; thus, decentralized sovereign ids and oracles must
ensure that both actors are valid consumers without the
need for them to exchange credentials, allowing non-
biased negotiations.
The DLT block shows the different DLT technologies
like BlockDAG (block directed acyclic graphs) and
HashGraph with a special focus on blockchain with its
many variations.
3.2 | Blockchain variations and
consensus mechanisms
Depending on the requirements for the application being
considered, different blockchain-based variations can be
used. For example, blockchains with different consensus
mechanisms and those with different blockchain access and
update controls, as well as those with different data storage,
managing, and cryptography techniques can be used.
Methods to update the blockchain can be permissioned or
permissionless. Simultaneously, access to the blockchain
can be made public, private, or restricted to a consortium of
users. Blockchain transactions can take place on-chain or
off-chain, or with different consensus protocols and data
managing methods. Data can be stored on a Cloud plat-
form, on premise, in the cache, or among the peer-to-peer
(P2P) nodes. The data domain block in Figure 5 incorpo-
rates the different elements used to handle blockchain data.
They include the cryptographic protocols, the transaction
model, the hash (which is used to identify the previous
block), the digital signature (imparted when creating a
block), and the data block header (which gives information
about the block). Several different consensus protocols have
been developed over time with varying performance levels,
including scalability, throughput, latency, and other indica-
tors as discussed in Reference 50. In Figure 5, some of these
are represented in the Proof-of-X block.
Proof of Work (PoW) is very popular with
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. PoW requires the partici-
pating nodes to spend energy solving a mathematical
problem that would grant them the authority to update
and add new transactions to the blockchain. Proof of
Stake (PoS) designates the next block's creator through
various combinations of random selection and associated
collateral in the blockchain or time spent on the
blockchain. Proof of Activity (PoA) is a combination of
FIGURE 4 PriceA and PriceB tariff-level plots for Test Set 1 vs Test Set 2 (A), for Test Set 1 vs Test Set 3 (B), for Test Set 1 vs Test Set
4 (C), and for Test Set 1 vs Test Set 4 (D)
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PoW and PoS, where PoW is used to mine a new block
and PoS is used to reward the miner. Proof of Burn (PoB)
was built as an alternative to PoW and is often referred to
as a PoW system without energy waste. PoB allows the
miners to “burn” the virtual currency tokens to gain
authority to add a new block to the blockchain. In Proof
of Value (PoV) consensus methodology each miner's
(user's) authority to add a new block to the blockchain
will be based on the contribution he/she delivers to the
blockchain system. Proof of Importance (PoI) consensus
methodology is similar to PoS. Unlike PoS, PoI considers
both the resources invested in the blockchain and the
user activity to maintain the blockchain. Proof of Capac-
ity (PoC) methodology employs the node's free hard drive
space to decide the mining rights and validate transac-
tions. In PoA consensus methodology, a small number of
limited nodes are handed the right to mine blocks and
validate transactions onto the blockchain. In ripple con-
sensus, each miner employs a trusted set of nodes within
the larger network to reach a consensus. To reach a
consensus, ripple consensus is run every few seconds to
validate the blockchain. In Stellar Consensus Protocol
(SCP), nodes can continue to validate their desired out-
come until a consensus is reached. If a set of nodes (quo-
rum) can't agree on what should be added to the
blockchain, the entire network will cease operations until
a consensus is reached. Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS)
is based on PoS consensus, which uses a technology-
based democratic process to elect a group of delegates to
validate blocks on behalf of all nodes in the network. In
Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET), an algorithm that gener-
ates a random elapsed time, is used to decide the
blockchain's mining rights.
3.3 | The blockchain-based smart
contract framework
A blockchain system that is tailor-made according to the
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FIGURE 5 Different distribution ledger technology (DLT) features connecting generation and consumption
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a desirable combination of these different features. In this
article, different consensus-building methodologies are
developed, tested, and analyzed, connecting the genera-
tion side to the consumer side. The study's ultimate
objective is to translate these consensus-building method-
ologies into a blockchain-based smart contract to auto-
mate the process of resource coordination between MGs.
This blockchain smart contract will facilitate increased
inter-grid (within a grid) and intra-grid (between grids)
TE trading. The Blockchain Smart Contract will establish
a consensus between interacting grids and between inter-
acting players within a grid. Note that the consensus for-
mation mechanism introduced in this article is on the
top layer while the blockchain retaining the information
is at the bottom; thereby, the consensus registration takes
place in blockchain, while the coordination takes place
on the top layer. The machine chart shown in Figure 6
depicts the different types of consensus methodologies
under consideration.
The following paragraphs describe the different con-
sensus formation methodologies with their respective
mechanisms. For each of the four different consensus
methodologies, a test set consisting of 10 grids represen-
ted by the 10 unique grid data files (in random order) is
used as inputs.
First, in Stand-Alone Sequential consensus methodol-
ogy, the grids are solved using the deterministic variant
of the CoMG51 model individually, using the information
of the demand, generation asset capacity, electricity gen-
eration, related costs, etc., present in the grid data files.
In the case of the Stand-Alone Sequential consensus for-
mation scheme, the grids are solved in random order.
Next, in the Linked Sequential consensus methodology,
the grids are solved just as in the Stand-Alone Sequential
mechanism with the consensus to solve the grids in a
pre-obtained order using a deterministic variant CoMG
model. However, unlike in Stand-Alone Sequential meth-
odology, an additional feature that makes the under-
utilized electricity generation available to the next grid,
indicated by the arrow in Figure 6, is implemented.
Therefore, additional electricity resources are made avail-
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FIGURE 6 Machine chart describing
the processes involved in the consensus
formations and interactions between grids.
Stand-Alone Sequential (top-left), Linked
Sequential (top-right), Profit Order Linked
(bottom-left), and GA Order Linked (bottom-
right)
MISHRA ET AL. 9
resources can be formed with a conventional resource
or/and a renewable resource from the available grid.
For Profit Order Linked consensus methodology, the
results from the Linked Sequential are made available to
determine the profit for each grid. In this case, the consen-
sus is to arrange and solve the grids in decreasing order by
the individual grid's profits. Therefore, the grid order may
change from the predetermined order. After the grids are
rearranged in the decreasing order of the individual grid's
profit, the grids are solved. As in the previous case, the
underutilized electricity generation is made available to the
next grid, indicated by the arrow in Figure 6. Finally, the
genetic algorithm (GA) Order Linked consensus methodol-
ogy is implemented. Here, an evolutionary computing
method based on a GA is employed to arrive at a consensus
on the grids' simulation order. The grid data obtained from
Linked Sequential are used as inputs to the GA. The GA
orders the grids based on an evolutionary strategy. The grids
are then arranged according to this order, which may differ
from the pre-obtained grid order. The grids are then solved
in the GA determined order, using a deterministic variant
of the CoMG model with the underutilized electricity gener-
ation made available to the next grid when it solves, indi-
cated by the arrow in Figure 6.
3.4 | The main consensus methodologies
Figure 7 represents the previously discussed four consen-
sus methodologies in the form of a flowchart. The flow
chart displays the process flow in a series of steps. From
the process flow, it is clear that Profit Order Linked (right
center) and GA Order Linked (far right) are more compu-
tationally expensive than Stand-Alone Sequential (far
left) and Linked Sequential (left center). All four pro-
cesses share a common starting point with shuffled grid
data files. The “shuffle” results in the generation of a new
test set. The same test set is used to test each of the four
consensus methodologies.
• Stand-Alone Sequential—In Stand-Alone Sequential
consensus formation, the grid data order is obtained
through a pre-shuffle. The pre-shuffle randomly
arranges the 10 grid data files in the test set. In the
Stand-Alone Sequential methodology, the consensus is
to solve the grid data in the pre-shuffle order. In this
case, EA and EB for all the grid data files are forced to
0 for all the nodes. This means that each grid is solved
in a Stand-Alone mode without interacting with the
subsequent neighboring grid. The grids have to solve
by themselves, taking into account the load, the exis-
ting resources (wind/PV and battery), operational
costs, and investment costs if additional investments in
wind/PV and/or battery storage assets are required.
Here, since EA and EB are forced to 0, PriceA and
PriceB are irrelevant.
• Linked sequential—In Linked Sequential consensus
formation, the grid data order is the same as in the
Stand-Alone Sequential method. Like in the Stand-
Alone Sequential method, here too the consensus is to
solve the grid data in the pre-shuffle order. However,
in this case, Gridx interacts with Gridx+1. That is,
each grid is connected to the next subsequent grid.
Therefore, the name Linked Sequential. Here the
FIGURE 7 Detailed flowchart of the steps involved in the four different consensus methodologies discussed
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“linking” refers to the transfer of underutilized energy,
which is generated but not used in Gridx to Gridx+1.
Here, CB and ER of Gridx, which is obtained after
solving Gridx, is transferred to EA and EB, respec-
tively, in Gridx+1. This is the “link” or interaction that
takes place between the two grids. This effectively
means that underutilized renewable energy generation
(represented by ER), and battery state of charge (SoC)
(represented by CB), is forwarded to the next grid for
utilization if required or if economically profitable.
This means underutilized wind/PV energy (ER) and
unused electricity energy stored in battery storage
(CB) is made available to the “next grid” in the
sequence. The price associated with the purchase of
the forwarded EA and EB from Gridx to Gridx+1 is
represented by PriceA and PriceB of Gridx+1 for each
node. It is important to remember that for Grid1, EA
and EB are by default kept random since they are not
connected to any previous grid.
• Profit order linked—In profit order consensus method,
the consensus is to order the grid data files according to
the descending order of each individual grid's profits, and
the input for these profits is obtained from the results of
Linked Sequential. As a result, the order of the grids,
which is based on the profit order, may differ from the
order of the grids in Linked Sequential. Subsequently,
the grids are solved in the new profit order where Gridx
interacts with Gridx+1. CB and ER of Gridx, which is
obtained after solving Gridx, is linked to EA and EB,
respectively, in Gridx+1, with the purchase price repre-
sented by PriceA and PriceB in Gridx+1.
• GA order linked—In this method, the consensus is
obtained by passing the information in the grid data
files (obtained from the results of the Linked Sequen-
tial method) into a GA. The GA reads the EA, EB,
PriceA, and PriceB of each of the 10 grid data files as
inputs. The GA processes this information and, using
evolutionary strategies, suggests the reordering of grid
data files. The grid data are then arranged in the GA's
suggested order. Once the grid data files are arranged
in that order, the grids are solved sequentially, where
Gridx interacts with Gridx+1. CB and ER of Gridx,
which is obtained after solving Gridx, is linked to EA
and EB, respectively in Gridx+1, with the purchase
price represented by PriceA and PriceB in Gridx+1.
3.5 | Evolutionary computing-genetic
algorithm
GAs52 are adaptive heuristic algorithms that are based on
the ideas of natural selection and genetics. GAs are
deployed to solve optimization problems using evolution-
ary theories. GAs simulate the process of natural selec-
tion, which means that those species that can adapt to
changes in their environment are able to survive and
reproduce and go to the next generation. In simple
words, they simulate “survival of the fittest” among indi-
viduals of consecutive generations for solving a problem.
• In the context of this article, GA is employed to order
the grids according to desirable features defined by
the user.
• Desirable features in the grid data include nonzero
values of EA and EB and low values of PriceA and
PriceB.
• Here, EA and EB indicate the underutilized or unused
conventional and renewable energy, respectively, gen-
erated from the previous grid.
• EA is populated with the information extracted from
the SoC of the batteries installed in the previous grid,
whereas EB is the underutilized renewable energy gen-
erated from wind or solar PV farms.
• PriceA and PriceB translate to the prices associated
with the purchase of EA and EB, respectively.
EA, EB, PriceA, and PriceB from each of the grid data
files are used as inputs in the genetic algorithm for analy-
sis. It is important to remember that the 10 grid data files
represent the 10 individual unique grids. GAs iteratively
updates the population of input elements. Upon each
iteration, the elements are evaluated using a fitness func-
tion. See the code representing the fitness function in
Algorithm 1.
A new generation of the population is obtained by
probabilistically selecting fitter individuals from the cur-
rent generation. Some of these individuals are admitted
to the next generation unchanged. Others are subjected
Algorithm 1
fitness Pkð ÞFitness function to obtain GA
scores for each generation
Result: Individual score for each member of Pk:
Pk :¼ The population at generation k;
foreach iPk do
Train dataset using a logistic regression (60%
of real data);
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to genetic operators such as crossover and mutation to
create new offspring. When the GA analysis is complete,
the GA assigns each grid data file a fitness score array
consisting of a series of 0's and 1's. So the grid data associ-
ated with the most number of 1's in the fitness score
array are the “fittest” grid according to the GA and the
grid data with the least number of 1's are the “least fit”
grid. In the context of the article and analysis, “fitness” is
defined as the ability of a grid to compete with other
grids, with nonzero values of EA and EB and low values
of PriceA and PriceB as desirable features.
Algorithm 2 represents the steps and processes associ-
ated with the proposed GA. Here, n is the number of ele-
ments in the population; χ is the fraction of the
population to be replaced by crossover in each iteration,
and μ is the mutation rate. Figures 8 and 9 show the GA
fitness scores of each grid for each of the 10 test sets for
the two seasons. The x-axis represents the 10 different
grids for each of the 10 test sets, and the y-axis represents
the fitness scores.
For GA-based consensus methodology, the grids (grid
data files) are arranged according to decreasing order of
fitness scores and the grids are solved using the determin-
istic CoMG model. The objective of this article is to test
different consensus-forming methodologies, analyze their
performances against certain basic measurable metrics,
and propose them for blockchain-based P2P TE trading
in MGs. We test different methodologies that use differ-
ent principles for arriving at a consensus via different
participants (here, the participants are the 10 grids), and
we analyze the subsequent results of these tests. The
results of different consensus-forming methodologies are
analyzed to understand which of these methodologies
performs better, under what conditions, for which type of
demand, in which season, for which parameter, with
what composition of the grid resources, etc. It is also
important to understand which consensus-forming meth-
odologies works “better” for which kind of renewable
resource present in the grid. A wind generation profile is
very different from that of solar PV production. Similarly,
the same can be said about the demand profile during
summer vs winter.
For analysis purposes, grid profit and underutilized
energy are considered as the two analyzing metrics. More
metrics can and should be considered for analysis. Here,
the word “better” is subjective, with a definition that can
be constructed and analyzed by the user accordingly. Per-
formance analysis of different consensus-forming meth-
odologies can have a profound impact in the real world
in terms of economic and environmental benefits to the
relevant parties. For example, this analysis gives greater
insight into which consensus-forming mechanism can be
used to maximize grid profits, or to reduce/avoid invest-
ments, or to maximize underutilized energy generated
from the grid (while remaining in profit), or to reduce
the amount of underutilized energy generated by show-
ing better utilization of resources within the grid, etc.
Thus, different consensus-forming methodologies can be
deployed, switched, or alternated, depending on the
objective at hand. For result analysis, two metrics have
been used, profit (or investments) and underutilized
energy. Profit is calculated as the total revenue minus the
sum of operational costs and investment costs. If the
result is positive, it indicates the grid in consideration is
generating profit while if the result is negative, the grid is
running costs higher than the revenue it generates.
Analysis of the underutilized energy metric when
compared to the profit metric is much more nuanced and
Algorithm 2
GA n,χ,μð ÞGA Order Linked
Result: The grids ids ordered following the fit-
ness score obtained.
Pk :¼ The population at generation k;
n_feat :¼ Number of columns of data input;





Set to 1 n_feat chromosomes;
Shuffle the array to mix 0 and 1;





Select 1χð Þn members of Pk and insert
into Pkþ1;
//2. Crossover;
Select χ nð Þ members of Pk; Pair these
members;
Produce offspring from each member;
Insert into Pkþ1;
//3. Mutate;
Select μnð Þ members of Pk;




k = k + 1;
while k≥max_gen;
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not as simple and straightforward. The underutilized
energy metric is constructed as the sum total of the total
SoC of the battery (wherever applicable) and the under-
utilized energy generated by the wind or PV farm at every
node. The underutilized energy is defined as the energy
generated or stored but not used by the grid in question.
These two metrics are used to understand the perfor-
mance of the grid with the existing resources and param-
eters. Ideally, it is desirable to maximize grid profit by
increasing the total revenue and by minimizing the oper-
ation and investment costs. Maximizing grid profits is a
favorable result taking a purely economic perspective.
Underutilized energy metric is the sum of the SoC of the
battery and underutilized generation of the generating
assets, which refers to the energy generated or stored but
not used by the grid. This perspective would indicate that
it is desirable to minimize this component, that is, mini-
mize what can be perceived as “wasted” energy. On the
other hand, this underutilized energy of Gridx is trans-
ferred to the next grid in the sequence Gridx+1 so it can
be used as an additional resource to solve that grid. This
would mean that the Gridx+1 can avoid certain invest-
ment costs in added new generation assets and tap
into the underutilized energy transferred from Gridx,
thus making the overall system more profitable. This
perspective would indicate that it is desirable to maxi-
mize the underutilized energy metric.
4 | SMART CONTRACT DESIGN
Smart contracts allow a system to be autonomous, inde-
pendent, and reliable for handling exchanges between
the different actors involved. The proposed design of a
smart contract is based on the consensus decisions about
ordering the actors as commented on previously. In this
context, energy transactions use P2P decentralized tech-
nology to ensure that consumers and suppliers exchange
energy directly, based on the consensus rules (see Refer-
ence 53). The consensus rules optimize the flow between
the actor (considering the current state of the system gen-
eration), demand, and prices. The actors need to sign a
contract using a decentralized app where they will accept
the rules and participate in the exchange. These rules are
created from the optimal solution, describing the flow,
amount, and price between a consumer and a supplier.
Thus, each time a new actor appears in the system, the con-
tracts must be recalculated and signed again using the app.
Therefore, the smart contract must guarantee the right to
participate in the system as a consumer, supplier or both,
FIGURE 8 Fitness score results for each of the 10 grids in each of the 10 test sets for the summer season
FIGURE 9 Fitness score results for each of the 10 grids in each of the 10 test sets for the winter season
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and include an operation for updating and assigning trans-
actions between peers and for accepting the terms and con-
ditions specified in the contract.
Moreover, to insure real peer transactions, the system
needs trusted, decentralized oracles that ensure and vali-
date that a sovereign id corresponds to the user that is
signing the contract and validates that signature. This
way, nobody in the system needs to know private infor-
mation about producers or suppliers. The system only
stores information about traceability and flow of the
energy, like capacity of generation, type of generation,
market prices, or demand. Algorithm 3 presents a pro-
posal for a smart contract to handle this situation. The
address represents an actor's public key, which is a
unique hash that identifies everyone in the system. The
contract contains a collection of rules (struct Rule) that
model the transaction where each supplier and consumer
know the quantity and the price and the date of the
agreement they must satisfy. To decide its consensus of
rules, this article proposes different algorithms to order
and decide the optimal connections and energy
exchanges. Using the optimal solution, the contract
owner inserts all the actors' suppliers and consumers into
the smart contract by adding their addresses. Then, each
actor must use the operation to accept and verify that
they know the conditions and agree with the terms.
Finally, the contract should supply other operations as
well, such as to check conditions, to get rules, to make
new transactions, and to get historical data. Therefore,
the data stored in the smart contract will be things such
as the current timestamp, market window, addresses of
actors, historical records of generation/demand, and real-
time transactions.
5 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 | Seasonal analysis
From the results for both summer 12 and winter 13 sea-
sons, a pattern clearly emerges for every test set that
shows the Stand-Alone Sequential consensus methodol-
ogy always underperforms compared to the other
“Linked” consensus methodologies in terms of the
cumulative total profits. The results show that Stand-
Alone Sequential, on average, makes 0.43% and 0.67%
less profit than the other “Linked” methods in summer
and winter seasons, respectively. Furthermore, the
results clearly show that all corresponding individual
grids make more profit from the “Linked” consensus
methodologies, irrespective of their positions in the
changed order (Profit or GA methods) or the unchanged
order (Linked Sequential) methodologies, compared to
the Stand-Alone Sequential methodology for both sum-
mer (12) and winter seasons (13) respectively. This is a
consistent pattern.
From the previous observations, it can be concluded
that the “Linking” methodologies, which make under-
utilized electricity generation available to the adjacent
grid, reduce the grid's need to invest in additional gener-
ating assets. This is because underutilized electricity,
which is shared between grids, is cheaper than investing
in expensive additional generating assets for both sum-
mer and winter seasons. This conclusion is validated by
the results obtained from the simulations. Figures 10 and
11 show the graphical representation of the number of
additional assets installed for each of the test sets (each
test set of 10 grids) and employ the four different method-












mapping (int ) Rule) rules;
//Inject flow-rules in the contract as contract
creator;
foreach connection solution do
add(Rule);
end
//Give right to participate and accept conditions;
foreach actorConsumers or Suppliers do
//Contract owner performs add operation
using owners address;
add(actor);
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In Stand-Alone Sequential methodology, EA and EB
are forced to zero. This means that EA and EB, which
represent the underutilized conventional (CB) and
renewable electricity (ER) from an adjacent grid, are
zero. Or, in other words, the grids do not have access to
this underutilized electricity generated from the neigh-
boring grid. Therefore, to satisfy the demand, they have
to invest in additional generation resources. In the
“Linked” methodologies, EA and EB are populated with
values of CB and ER, indicating the availability of under-
utilized electricity from a neighboring grid. This key dif-
ference between the two methodologies explains the
patterns observed in Figures 10 and 11. It is also notewor-
thy that the number of additional generating assets
required during the summer season for Stand-Alone
Sequential is almost double that needed for the “Linked”
methodologies for each test set, but that number still does
not exceed 10. Notably for the winter season, the number
of additional generating assets required for Stand-Alone
Sequential is almost 50 units more than that of the
“Linked” methodologies.
The large difference in the additional assets required
to satisfy demand in winter vs summer can be attributed
to the fact that in winter, the demand is higher and
cumulatively more than in summer. Moreover, a differ-
ent generating asset with a different generating profile
and different peak generation periods is considered for
the analysis, that is, solar PV generation for the summer
season and wind generation in the winter season. From
the scaled grid profit results in Figures 10 and 11. the plot
patterns suggest that the “Linked” consensus methodolo-
gies profits in winter are more or less consistently higher
than the Stand-Alone Sequential consensus methodology.
The same cannot be said for the summer season
(Figure 12). The plot pattern of “Linked” consensus
methodologies is more varied and not consistently above
the profits of Stand-Alone Sequential consensus
methodology.
Interestingly, even though the individual grid profits
in summer seem more varied than the scaled profits in
Figure 12 for the different “Linked” methodologies, they
perform comparably, with very little to differentiate
between them in terms of overall system profits. When
conducting a simple overall system profit comparison for
summer, it is observed that GA works better in 2 of 10 test
sets, whereas Profit Order Linked performs better in just
one test set and for the other test sets, Linked Sequential
performed better. Interestingly, unlike in summer, the
individual grid profits for the winter in Figure 13 show
that the different linked methodologies perform similarly
to each other. Also, there is more to differentiate in the
overall system profits for the different “Linked” method-
ologies when compared to that from the summer results.
In winter, (Figure 13) Linked sequential methodology
generated more profit in five test sets, whereas GA order
methodology generated more profit in four test sets, and
FIGURE 10 Additional generation assets installed for the summer season
FIGURE 11 Additional generation assets installed for the winter season
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profit order generated more profit in the remaining one
test set.
During summer (Figure 12) a consistent pattern is
observed that all of the “Linked” methodologies produce
more underutilized electricity than Stand-Alone Sequen-
tial. This can be attributed to the fact that since solar pro-
duction during summer is high and grid demand is low,
there is underutilized renewable electricity. This under-
utilized renewable electricity is being made available for
utilization by the subsequent grids, and battery storage is
being recharged consistently. Since the SoC of the battery
is one of the two components that constitute the under-
utilized electricity metric, this explains this observation.
It is noticed that during summer, Profit Order Linked
produces on average slightly more underutilized electric-
ity (2%) than the other two “Linked” methodologies. This
may be explained by the fact that in Profit Order method-
ology, the grids are arranged in decreasing order of grid
profit. This means that the first grid will be the most self-
sufficient grid in terms of generating assets (including
consideration of battery storage), whereas the last grid
will be the least self-sufficient. And since demand during
summer is largely satisfied by the assets already available,
this means that the CB and ER (the underutilized elec-
tricity) is largely maximized for each grid, proceeding in
decreasing profit order.
FIGURE 12 Scaled grid profit plots for Test Set 1 (A), Test Set 2 (B), Test Set 3 (C), Test Set 4 (D), Test Set 5 (E), Test Set 6 (F), Test Set
7 (G), Test Set 8 (H), Test Set 9 (I), and Test Set 10 (J) along with grid data file orders of the different consensus methodologies for the
summer season
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Winter is more difficult to analyze. There is no clear,
discernable pattern for underutilized energy metrics in
winter. For some test sets, “Linked” methods generate
more underutilized electricity, whereas for other test sets,
“Linked” methods generate less than the Stand-Alone
Sequential method. It is observed that the different
“Linked” methodologies produce on average almost iden-
tical underutilized energy, with nothing to distinguish
between them across all 10 test sets. It is also observed
from the scaled grid profit plots that Linked Sequential
always outperforms in individual grid profit and in over-
all system profit terms when compared to Stand-Alone
Sequential methodology, which is an important result
considering in both of these methods the grid order is the
same. This shows that having underutilized electricity
generation available to the grid allows the grid to avoid
expensive investments and to increase profits. This is true
for both summer and winter. In fact, in winter the profit
difference between Linked Sequential and Stand-Alone
Sequential is greater than during summer. This may be
because in winter the Linked Sequential methodology
makes more substantial savings on asset investments due
to increased procurement of cheap EA and EB to meet
the high demand.
During summer, in profit order simulation, the grid
data files are in the same order for all the test sets. This
can be explained by the fact that during summer, the
demand is low and solar generation is abundant; thus,
FIGURE 13 Scaled grid profit plots for Test Set 1 (A), Test Set 2 (B), Test Set 3 (C), Test Set 4 (D), Test Set 5 (E), Test Set 6 (F), Test Set 7 (G),
Test Set 8 (H), Test Set 9 (I), and Test Set 10 (J) along with grid data file orders of the different consensus methodologies for the winter season
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there is very little, if any, utilization of EA and
EB. Therefore, the profit margins are marginally
influenced. During winter (Figure 10), in profit order
simulation the grid data files are not in the same order
for all the test sets, unlike in summer. This can be
accounted for by the fact that during winter, the demand
is high and the renewable generation peaks do not coin-
cide with demand peaks, meaning the grids have to rely
on battery storage and utilization of EA and EB when
appropriate. This disconnect between demand peak and
generation peak timing influences the grid profit mar-
gins. It should be noted that only a few grids change posi-
tion in the order, and it is not the case that the grid
orders across the test sets are very different.
Both for summer and winter, in GA order simulation,
the grid data files are in the same order for all the test sets.
This is accounted for by the fact that GA order is generated
using the information of EA, EB, PriceA, and PriceB from
each grid data file. This information is different for each of
the 10 test sets. The change in the GA grid order from test
set to test set for both seasons is wildly different. In the
summer results, it is noticed that for Profit Order Linked
simulation, the grids produce gradually decreasing grid
profits, which is what is expected. However, in winter, with
Profit Order Linked simulation, the grids produce gradually
decreasing profits, with instances of a subsequent grid gen-
erating more profit than its immediate predecessor. This
can be accounted for by the fact that, as discussed in the
previous points, due to the demand and generation profile
in winter, the grids have to rely more on EA and EB to
meet high grid demand. There may be situations when EA
and EB might be available at a cheaper cost to the previous
grid, or that EA and EB are available in abundance, such
that few generating assets can be avoided, or the grid may
not need to purchase EA and EB, etc., which could result in
increased profits.
Different data normalization methods have also been
used to extract different information, inferences, and pat-
terns from the results. For this analysis, mean normaliza-
tion and SD normalization have been conducted. For both
summer and winter, the analysis does not show deviation
from what can be observed using the simple raw numeric
comparison of scaled grid profits. In contrast, different nor-
malization methods shed more light on how the individual
grid profits are organized around the average and SD of
overall grid profits. It is observed that the GA consensus
methodology performs less consistently among its peer
“Linked” consensus methodologies in terms of individual
grid profits in summer. The same cannot be said for winter.
With regard to overall system profits, the GA consensus
methodology performs consistently with its peer “Linked”
methodologies in summer. In winter, GA performed better
in 4 of the 10 test sets in terms of overall system profits,
whereas in the remaining six test sets, its performance was
almost consistent with its peer “Linked” consensus method-
ologies. For GA consensus, the performance of the under-
utilized electricity metric is consistent for the individual
grids and the overall system, with the overall trend for high
underutilized electricity in summer. In contrast, in winter,
there is no discernible trend visible.
The following figures, that is, Figures 12 and 13 show
the scaled grid profit plots (scaled from 0 to 1) and the
Grid Data Orders for Stand-Alone Sequential, Linked
Sequential, Profit Order Linked, and GA Order Linked
methodologies for each of the 10 test sets for both the
summer and winter seasons.
5.2 | Price signal analysis through tariffs
As mentioned earlier in the article, five tariff levels are
used and are represented by the five test sets. For each of
these five test sets, four different consensus methodolo-
gies are analyzed. Test Set 1—a reference or base level
tariffs of PriceA and PriceB; Test Set 2—tariffs two times
(2); Test Set 3—tariffs 1.5 times (1.5); Test Set 4—
tariffs 0.5 times (0.5), and finally Test Set 5—tariffs 0.25
times (0.25) the base level.
Observable from the resulting patterns of the scaled
grid profit plots, both summer (Figure 14) and winter
FIGURE 14 Additional generation assets installed in the summer season for different PriceA and PriceB tariff levels
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(Figure 15) “Linked” methodologies always produce
more profit for the individual grids and, as a result, pro-
duce more profit for the overall system than the Stand-
Alone Sequential methodology. There is another observ-
able pattern from the scaled grid profit plots for both
summer (Figure 14) and winter (Figure 15) that as the
tariffs are lowered, the individual grids produce more
profits, which is what is expected. Buying underutilized
resource available at cheaper rates increases profits. As
individual grids make more profits as the tariffs are
lowered, the overall system also makes more profits.
Interestingly, it is observed that proportional change in
tariffs does not produce a proportional change in profits.
That is, when the tariffs are doubled (Test Set 2), overall
system profits decrease slightly, but when the tariffs are
halved (Test Set 4), the overall system profits increase
more than they decrease when the tariffs doubled. And
as the tariffs further decrease to a quarter (Test Set 5), the
overall system profits increase measurably. This phenom-
enon is true for both summer and winter, although in
winter, the shift in profit margins in this analysis is more
pronounced.
These patterns can be explained by the situation that
emerges when tariffs are reduced to a level where the
operational cost of accessing grid storage may be higher
than PriceA, PriceB, or both, for large periods of the anal-
ysis. In this situation, grids that were previously using
grid storage to fulfill energy requirements end up pur-
chasing more energy from the neighboring grid, not
because grid storage is exhausted, but because it is
cheaper. This situation is more pronounced in winter
than in summer because in winter, the demand is higher
and cumulatively more expensive than in the summer.
Moreover, a different generating asset with a different
generating profile and different peak generation periods
also contributes to this result. From the previous observa-
tions, it can be concluded that the “Linking” methodolo-
gies, which make available underutilized electricity
generation to the adjacent grid, reduce the grid's need of
investing in additional generating assets. This is true for
both the both summer and winter. This is because under-
utilized electricity, which is shared between grids, is
cheaper than investing in expensive additional generating
assets. Figures 14 and 15 show the graphical representa-
tion of the number of additional assets installed
(required) for the different PriceA and PriceB tariff levels.
Figure 14 represents the summer season results, whereas
Figure 15 does the same for the winter season. Like in
the results for seasonal analysis, the explanation for the
reduced number of generating assets installed is the same
for both seasons.
A pattern emerged indicating that as tariffs are
reduced, the number of additional generating assets
installed is also reduced. Conversely, as tariffs are
increased, the number of additional generating assets
installed also increases. Interestingly, the decrease in tar-
iffs strongly influences the number of generating assets
installed, unlike with the increase in tariffs. This is true
for both summer and winter. The decision to install addi-
tional assets is not just influenced by the tariffs but also
by the operational cost of grid storage.
In both summer (Figure 16) and winter (Figure 17),
the pattern analysis of the scaled grid profits for each tar-
iff level suggests that each of the “Linked” methodologies
performs comparably, with very little to differentiate
between them in terms of individual grid profits and
overall system profits. There is an exception in the case of
winter Test Set 1, in which GA Order Linked performed
better than its peers. It is noticeable from the pattern of
the results that as the tariffs increase, the profits decrease.
Therefore, there can be a situation when the tariffs are
sufficiently high so as to make the “Linked” methodolo-
gies less profitable than the Stand-Alone Sequential. This
situation probably comes about when there are suffi-
ciently high tariffs, low installed grid storage and genera-
tion capacity, and high generation installation costs.
For both the summer (Figure 16) and winter
(Figure 17), the pattern demonstrates that an increase in
tariffs does not drastically affect the underutilized energy
metric; the metric remains mostly consistent for Test Set
FIGURE 15 Additional generation assets installed in the winter season for different PriceA and PriceB tariff levels
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1, 2, and 3. But, in the case in which the tariffs are
reduced, it is observed that the underutilized energy met-
ric increases significantly. This is explained by the fact
that when tariffs are reduced, more energy is purchased
from EA and EB instead of from the battery, and this is
reasonable given that the battery SoC is one of the two
FIGURE 17 Scaled grid profit plots for tariff-level Test Set 1 (A), Test Set 2 (B), Test Set 3 (C), Test Set 4, (D) and Test Set 5 (E) along
with grid data file orders of the different consensus methodologies for the winter season
FIGURE 16 Scaled grid profit plots for tariff-Level Test Set 1 (A), Test Set 2 (B), Test Set 3 (C), Test Set 4, (D) and Test Set 5 (E) along
with grid data file orders of the different consensus methodologies of the summer season
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factors that makes up the underutilized energy metric. It
is important to note that again the operational cost of the
battery plays an important role in this metric. For both
seasons, it is observed that the tariffs influence the GA
Order strongly, whereas the tariffs influence the Profit
Order differently for summer and winter. In summer, the
profit order is largely consistent, whereas in winter, the
profit order is less consistent, but not drastically different.
It is observed from the individual grid and overall sys-
tem analysis that the GA consensus methodology per-
forms less consistently among its peer “Linked”
consensus methodologies in individual grid, but performs
consistently in overall system with the profit metric in
summer. While in winter, GA performed better in one of
the five test sets with the profit metrics, in the remaining
four test sets, it was almost consistent with its peer
“Linked” consensus methodologies. The following fig-
ures, that is, Figure 16 and Figure 17, show the scaled
grid profit plots and the Grid Data Orders for Stand-
Alone Sequential, Linked Sequential, Profit Order Linked
and GA Order Linked methodologies for each of the five
different tariff level test sets for both the summer
(Figure 16) and winter (Figure 17) seasons.
6 | CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
SCOPE
This article investigates energy-as-a-service business
models for smart contract formation. The smart contract
facilitates peer-to-peer energy transactions in a VPP
through a local energy market. This article also proposes
a novel evolutionary computing strategy and a compari-
son among existing strategies for smart contract forma-
tion. In the first layer, a generation and transmission
expansion planning model, as presented in Reference 51
is used for the simulation. In the second layer, the pro-
posed strategies are implemented on top of the MILP
model. Simulations are conducted for 10 cases with
10 grids in each case for summer and winter seasons.
The analysis of the simulation results illustrates that
the proposed evolutionary computing strategy performs
better than other strategies in the winter season. Mean-
while, in summer, all strategies perform similarly to one
another. Since the peak demand period used in this study
is in winter, the winter results are particularly informa-
tive. In winter, the dependence on external energy
resources is higher due to higher demand, whereas peak
demand and generation are spread apart. The proposed
evolutionary strategy outperforms other methods in 4 of
10 scenarios to optimally schedule the smart contract for-
mation because the proposed strategy maximizes total
profit while minimizing energy losses. There is a pattern
where the proposed evolutionary strategy outperforms
others. Moreover, the overall analysis demonstrates that
energy-as-a-service business models are profitable and
provide better utilization of the existing capacity of gener-
ation units. The proposed strategy can be used in prepar-
ing policies for smart contract formations. The energy
landscape is becoming more distributed and
decentralized. The proposed model and analysis contrib-
ute to energy transactions and EaaS models for modern
distributed energy resources. The proposed approach has
a high value for real-world industries, as it allows a VPP
owner to utilize the proposed model and strategies to
determine how to best organize transactions. In addition,
a small-scale producer could utilize the model to opti-
mally plan the capacity of assets to maximize the profits.
The current article is focused on the coordination
strategies for EaaS. The explanation of the strategies is
now extended with more details. An additional figure is
also added to better clarify the simulations and results.
However, the analysis does not extend to market clearing
mechanisms. In a subsequent work, the authors will
address the market clearing problem with a proposed
evolutionary computing strategy for smart contract
formation.
In a future research, demand side flexibility could be
investigated among the portfolio of technologies in a
VPP. In addition, the transparency of energy flows to ver-
ify their origin could also be investigated. Also, the per-
formance metrics may further be refined, including other
metrics. Finally, different heuristic techniques can be fur-
ther explored to investigate how the result changes in
comparison with the GA.
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